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Domestic Partnership Laws in the United States: A 
Review and Critique∗ 
William C. Duncan∗∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Arrangements providing for employment and other social bene-
fits based on “domestic partnership” status are becoming increas-
ingly common in both the private and the public sectors. For exam-
ple, the Human Rights Campaign reports that 3,572 private 
companies, colleges, universities, and governments offer domestic 
partnership benefits to their employees.1 Recently, the state legisla-
ture of California began to offer domestic partnership benefits to 
partners of legislative employees.2 In 2000, an arbitrator in Con-
necticut ruled that the state had to offer health benefits for same-sex 
partners of state employees.3 A number of countries and foreign ju-
risdictions have also created a special status for same-sex couples. 




 ∗ This article was presented at the Symposium on the ALI Principles on the Law of 
Family Dissolution, held at Brigham Young University’s J. Reuben Clark Law School on Feb-
ruary 1, 2001. 
 ∗∗ Assistant Director, Marriage Law Project, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic 
University of America. I am particularly grateful to Margaret Robertson and James Peters of 
the BYU Law Review staff for their superb editorial comments on the article. 
 1. DARYL HERRSCHAFT & KIM I. MILLS, THE STATE OF THE WORKPLACE FOR 
LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDERED AMERICANS 2000 8 (2000). 
 2. Capitol Workers Win New Benefit; Health Coverage Quietly Extended to Unmarried 
Partners, PRESS-ENTERPRISE (Riverside, CA), May 12, 1999, at A3. 
 3. Matthew Daly, Ruling Favors Same-Sex Couples, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 2, 
2000, at A3. 
 4. Larry Rohter, Brazil Grants Rights to Same-Sex Pairs, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, June 11, 
2000, at A26. 
 5. Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act, Bill C-23, § 125 (2000). 
 6. The Danish Registered Partnership Act, Act No. 372 (1989). 
 7. Adam Sage, Teachers Fake Gay Love to Move Jobs, TIMES (London), May 25, 2000, 
at 18. 
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land,8 Norway,9 Sweden,10 Switzerland,11 New South Wales (Austra-
lia),12 and Aragon (Spain).13 Now, Germany and Hungary are also 
considering creating a status for same-sex domestic partners.14 
These laws are of increasing concern not only because of their 
frequency, but also because of their attractiveness as a substitute for 
recognition of same-sex “marriage.” Politicians may offer domestic 
partnership benefits, or something similar, as a concession. This hap-
pened in Hawaii in 1997 when the state marriage amendment was 
being considered in the legislature.15 Similarly, the Iowa marriage 
recognition statute (providing that an out-of-state same-sex “mar-
riage” would not be valid in Iowa) included a provision creating a 
task force to report on the issue of domestic partners.16 Most con-
spicuously, the Vermont Legislature created the status of “civil un-
ions” for same-sex couples17 after a Vermont Supreme Court deci-
sion mandated the provision of marriage benefits to same-sex couples 
by the legislature and threatened to force recognition of same-sex 
“marriage” if the legislature did not comply.18 
Now the American Law Institute (“ALI”) has joined the fray by 
endorsing a domestic partnership status.19 
This paper will survey the domestic partnership laws of various 
U.S. jurisdictions and will compare the ALI proposal with these laws. 
It will also discuss the litigation surrounding these provisions and 
 
 8. Icelandic Confirmed Partnership Act, No. 87 (1996). 
 9. Norwegian Registered Partnerships Act, Act No. 40 (1993). 
 10. Swedish Registered Partnership Act, Act No. 1994:1117 (1994). 
 11. Partnerships Broadened in Switzerland, WASH. BLADE, Mar. 31, 2000. 
 12. New South Wales Property (Relationships) Legislation Amendment Act (1999). 
 13. Domestic Partnerships Granted by Law in Aragon, at http://www.redestb.es/trian-
gulo/leyarin.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2001). 
 14. German Lawmakers Move Toward Giving Legal Status to Gay Couples, CHI. TRIB., 
Nov. 11, 2000, at 8; Jana Pinterovc & Michele Legge, Gay Marriage Bill Likely to Win Ap-
proval, PRAGUE POST, March 17, 1999. 
 15. See David Orgon Coolidge, The Hawaii Marriage Amendment: Its Origins, Meaning 
and Constitutionality, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 19, 27–30 (2000). 
 16. 1998 Ia. H.F. 382, § 4 (Apr. 15, 1998); see also David Orgon Coolidge & William 
C. Duncan, Definition or Discrimination? State Marriage Recognition Statutes in the “Same-Sex 
Marriage” Debate, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1, 13 (1998). 
 17. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §1201 (2000). 
 18. Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (1999). 
 19. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS (Tentative Draft No. 4, Apr. 10, 2000) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES (Tenta-
tive Draft No. 4)]. 
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briefly comment on legal and policy implications of domestic part-
nership statutes. 
II. STATE DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP PROVISIONS 
Only three states—Hawaii, California, and Vermont—have do-
mestic partnership statutes. The Hawaii law was adopted in 1997 as a 
tradeoff for the passage of the Marriage Amendment, which would 
have prevented the legalization of same-sex “marriage.”20 The Ha-
waii law provides a number of benefits to state employees and citi-
zens, although its effect on private employers is limited. Its provi-
sions include funeral leave for state employees, hospital visitation 
rights, health insurance coverage for partners of state employees, and 
the ability to claim an elective share of a partner’s estate.21 Hawaii’s 
term for domestic partners is “reciprocal beneficiaries.” Reciprocal 
beneficiaries must be eighteen years old, ineligible to marry, and 
unmarried. They must sign a declaration of intent,22 which is filed 
with the director of the state health department.23 Reciprocal benefi-
ciary status can be ended by filing a declaration with the state health 
department or by marriage.24 Notably, the Hawaii statute explicitly 
includes relationships not involving sex or the same residence. While 
the law was originally intended to cover private as well as public em-
ployers, private employers filed suit. The litigation settled with an 
agreement that the law would only apply to a small number of pri-
vate employers.25 
The California law, enacted in 1999, creates a registry whereby 
same-sex couples and couples over age sixty-two can register for the 
right to hospital visitation and to appoint their partner a beneficiary 
on their insurance.26 
Vermont’s act creates “civil union” status.27 The law provides 
that town and county clerks will begin to issue “certificates of civil 
union” to same-sex couples who are not married or party to another 
civil union and who are not related to each other within the degrees 
 
 20. See Coolidge, supra note 15. 
 21. 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws 383. 
 22. Id. §§ 1–4. 
 23. HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-5 (2000). 
 24. Id. § 572C-7. 
 25. See Coolidge, supra note 15, at 274–75 n.246. 
 26. 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 588 (West). 
 27. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 (2000). 
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prohibited by the marriage laws.28 It also gives jurisdiction to the 
family court over all cases based on the civil union law.29 The law 
provides that parties to a civil union will “have all the same benefits, 
protections and responsibilities under law . . . as are granted to 
spouses in a marriage.”30 It also provides that the terms “spouse,” 
“family,” and similar terms in the law will be construed to include 
couples in a civil union, and outlines a list of twenty-four nonexclu-
sive kinds of law that will now be applied to same-sex couples on the 
same terms as married spouses.31 The law also contains a requirement 
that 
insurers shall provide dependent coverage to parties to a civil union 
that is equivalent to that provided to married insureds. An individ-
ual or group health insurance policy which provides coverage for a 
spouse or family member of the insured shall also provide the 
equivalent coverage for a party to a civil union.32 
The bill also creates a new status of “reciprocal beneficiaries,” de-
fined as two people related by blood or adoption who want to enjoy 
some benefits of marriage.33 Reciprocal beneficiaries are given rights 
related to: (1) hospital visitation and medical decision-making;34 (2) 
decision-making relating to anatomical gifts;35 (3) decision-making 
relating to disposition of remains;36 (4) “[d]urable power of attorney 
for health care”;37 (5) “[p]atient’s bill of rights”;38 (6) nursing home 
patient’s bill of rights;39 and (7) abuse prevention.40 
The National Gay and Lesbian Task Force indicates that Con-
necticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, and Wash-
ington also provide for non-statutory benefits for domestic partners 
 
 28. Id. § 1203. 
 29. Id. § 1206. 
 30. Id. § 1204(a). 
 31. Id. § 1204(e). 
 32. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4063(a) (2000). 
 33. Id. tit. 15, § 1303 (2000). 
 34. Id. tit. 18, § 1853 (2000). 
 35. Id. tit. 18, § 5240(a)(2). 
 36. Id. tit. 18, § 5220. 
 37. Id. tit. 14, § 3456 (2000). 
 38. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1852 (2000). 
 39. Id. tit. 33, § 7301. 
 40. Id. tit. 15, § 1101 (2000). 
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of public employees.41 
III. MUNICIPAL DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP ORDINANCES 
Some form of domestic partnership benefits is reportedly offered 
to employees or residents of as many as seventy-four cities and coun-
ties.42 The first city to have offered such benefits was Berkeley, Cali-
fornia, which did so in 1984.43 The ordinances creating municipal 
benefits can vary widely but include a number of common elements. 
This paper examines the ordinances or policies of thirty-five munici-
palities.44 
A. Statement of Purpose 
A number of municipalities include findings or a statement of 
purpose in their domestic partnership laws.45 Several themes emerge 
in these statements. First is a reference to domestic partnerships as a 
different form of “family.” Ann Arbor’s statement of purpose says: 
“Many persons today share a life as families in enduring and commit-
ted relationships apart from marriages. . . . The city of Ann Arbor has 
an interest in strengthening and supporting all caring, committed 
and responsible family forms.”46 Cambridge’s ordinance says: “The 
City Council acknowledges that the people’s lives have evolved from 
when laws governing family relationships were enacted. Perpetuation 
of the traditional definitions of ‘family’ excludes a significant seg-
 
 41. National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Domestic Partner Benefits for State Employees, 
at http://www.ngltf.org/pi/dpbstatebr.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2001). 
 42. See HERRSCHAFT & MILLS, supra note 1, at 9. 
 43. See Partners Task Force for Gay and Lesbian Couples, Governments Offering Bene-
fits, at http://www.buddybuddy.com/d-p-gov.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2001). 
 44. These were the statutes available online. Some of the cities reported to have domes-
tic partnership ordinances do not, in fact, have such laws. 
 45. ANN ARBOR, MICH., CODE ch. 110, § 9:86 (2001); BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., 
CODE OF ORDINANCES § 16½-151 (1999); CAMBRIDGE, MASS., ORDINANCE § 2.119.010 
(1992); IOWA CITY, IOWA, CODE ch. 6, § 2-6-1 (1994); ITHACA, N.Y., CODE § 215-20 
(2000); LOS ANGELES COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 2.210.010 (1999); MARIN COUNTY, CAL., 
CODE § 6.88.010 (1993); MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 142.10 (1991); 
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 33-22 (1999); MULTNOMAH 
COUNTY, OR., ADOPTED DOCUMENTS, Ord. No. 948 (2000); PROVINCETOWN, MASS., 
GENERAL BY-LAWS § 7-1 (1998); SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., MUN. CODE § 62.1 (1990); SANTA 
BARBARA COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 42-1 (2001); SANTA MONICA, CAL., MUN. CODE § 
4.60.010 (1995). 
 46. ANN ARBOR CODE ch. 110, § 9:86 (2000) (emphasis added). 
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ment of the Cambridge population.”47 The notion of an expanding 
understanding of family also appears in the Iowa City law: “The city 
recognizes that nationwide debate has advanced an expanded con-
cept of familial relationships beyond traditional marital and blood re-
lationships. This expanded concept recognizes the relationship of 
two (2) non-married but committed adult partners.”48 Ithaca’s ordi-
nance expresses an interest in “strengthening and supporting all car-
ing, committed and responsible family forms” and describes domes-
tic partnership as “a relationship and family unit that is deserving of 
official recognition.”49 Broward County’s findings include the con-
tention that domestic partners “often live in a committed family re-
lationship.”50 Santa Monica’s law says that “domestic partners live in 
an intimate and committed family relationship.”51 
Another common theme is diversity. The Ann Arbor language 
indicates the city’s interest in “cultural diversity.”52 Diversity is also 
invoked in the ordinances of Cambridge, Montgomery County, and 
Provincetown.53 
A few statements describe their purpose as involving concepts of 
fairness or equal treatment with regard to marriage benefits. Iowa 
City’s domestic partnership ordinance is typical: “It is appropriate 
and fair that certain of the societal privileges and benefits now ac-
corded to members of a marriage be extended to those who meet 
the qualifications of a domestic partnership.”54 The Broward County 
language is interesting: 
Domestic partners are often denied public and private sector bene-
fits because there is no established system for such relationships to 
be registered and/or recognized. In addition, because of the status 
of their relationship, domestic partners in many cases are not ex-
 
 47. CAMBRIDGE ORDINANCE § 2.119.010 (emphasis added). The Provincetown lan-
guage is identical except for jurisdiction-specific references. PROVINCETOWN GENERAL BY-
LAWS § 7-1. 
 48. IOWA CITY CODE ch. 6 § 2-6-1 (emphasis added). The same language is contained 
in the Minneapolis ordinance. MINNEAPOLIS CODE OF ORDINANCES § 142.10. 
 49. ITHACA CODE § 215-20(a) (emphasis added). 
 50. BROWARD COUNTY CODE OF ORDINANCES § 16 ½-151(a) (emphasis added). 
 51. SANTA MONICA, CAL., MUN. CODE § 4.60.010 (1995) (emphasis added). 
 52. ANN ARBOR, MICH., CODE ch. 110, § 9:86 (2000). 
 53. CAMBRIDGE, MASS., ORDINANCE § 2.119.010 (1992); MONTGOMERY COUNTY, 
MD., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 33-22 (1999); PROVINCETOWN, MASS., GENERAL BY-LAWS § 
7-1 (1998). 
 54. IOWA CITY, IOWA, CODE ch. 6, § 2-6-1 (1994). 
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tended certain employment benefits that are otherwise made avail-
able to other employees.55 
Montgomery County’s language reads thus: “The County be-
lieves it is unfair to treat employees differently based solely on 
whether the employee’s partner is legally recognized as a spouse.”56 
Like Broward County, Santa Monica’s law emphasizes that unmar-
ried couples “are often denied public and private sector benefits be-
cause no mechanism has been established for registering their 
relationship.”57 
Interestingly, many statutes focus on the purpose of providing 
recognition or validation for unmarried couples. The Los Angeles 
County ordinance includes this statement: “As domestic partnerships 
have become more prevalent among individuals who reside or are 
employed within the county, a corresponding need has arisen on the 
part of persons in such relationships and on society’s part generally 
for a means for such persons to give public notice of their relation-
ships.”58 Similarly, the San Francisco ordinance states: “The purpose 
of this ordinance is to create a way to recognize intimate committed 
relationships, including those of lesbians and gay men who otherwise 
are denied the right to identify the partners with whom they share their 
lives.”59 Similar language is contained in the Marin County and Santa 
Barbara ordinances.60 The Multnomah County statement of purpose 
describes its domestic partnership registry as a “means by which un-
married, committed couples who share a life and home together may 
document their relationship.”61 Some of the ordinances focus not 
merely on recognition but on providing approbation to the relation-
ship. For instance, the Ann Arbor ordinance indicates that its domes-
tic partnership system provides “a mechanism for the public expres-
sion, sanction and documentation of the commitment reflected by 
the domestic partnership.”62 Failing to give legal status, according to 
 
 55. BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 16½-151 (1999). 
 56. MONTGOMERY COUNTY CODE OF ORDINANCES § 33-22. 
 57. SANTA MONICA, CAL., MUN. CODE § 4.60.010 (1995). 
 58. LOS ANGELES COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 2.210.010 (1999) (emphasis added). 
 59. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., MUN. CODE § 62.1 (1990) (emphasis added). 
 60. MARIN COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 6.88.010 (1993); see also SANTA BARBARA 
COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 42-1 (2001) (using the exact same language as Los Angeles County). 
 61. MULTNOMAH COUNTY, OR., ADOPTED DOCUMENTS, Ord. No. 948, § 27.351 
(2000). 
 62. ANN ARBOR, MICH., CODE ch. 110, § 9:86 (2001). 
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the Cambridge statement of purpose, “deprives [unmarried couples] 
of recognition and validation.”63 
Finally, a few of the laws describe benefits to the city or county 
that will come from domestic partnership recognition. Broward 
County’s ordinance says that “the provision of domestic partner 
benefits promotes employee recruitment, employee retention, and 
employee loyalty.”64 Montgomery County’s provision says: “Provid-
ing domestic partner benefits will significantly enhance the County’s 
ability to recruit and retain highly qualified employees and will pro-
mote employee loyalty and workplace diversity.”65 
B. Registration 
All but one of the policies or ordinances require some form of 
registration.66 Most merely require a statement, affidavit, or form to 
be filed with the city or county clerk.67 A few require enrollment 
 
 63. CAMBRIDGE, MASS., ORDINANCE § 2.119.010 (1992). 
 64. BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 16½-151 (1999). 
 65. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 33-22 (1999). 
 66. Montgomery County allows for registration but also provides that a domestic part-
nership can be established by filling the legal requirements of the ordinance. See id. 
 67. ALAMEDA COUNTY, CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 3.20.170 (2000); Albuquerque, N.M., 
Domestic Partners Policies & Procedures (on file with author); ANN ARBOR, MICH., CODE ch. 
110, § 9:88 (2001); ATLANTA, GA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 94-131 (2000); Berkeley, Cal., 
City Clerk, Domestic Partnership Information, at http://www.ci.berke-
ley.ca.us/clerk/forms/domesticaffidavitform.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2001); BROWARD 
COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 16½-153 (1999); CAMBRIDGE, MASS., ORDINANCE 
§ 2.119.030 (1992); Town of Eastchester, N.Y., Town Board Minutes (Sept. 9, 2000) (on file 
with author); IOWA CITY, IOWA, CODE ch. 6, § 2-6-3 (1994); ITHACA, N.Y., CODE § 215-22 
(2000); KEY WEST, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 72.32 (1998); KING COUNTY, WASH., 
CODE § 3.12.010 (1998); LAGUNA BEACH, CAL., MUN. CODE § 1.12.010 (1992); LOS 
ANGELES COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 2.210.020 (1999); MADISON, WIS., MUN. CODE § 
3.23(10)(d) (1998); MARIN COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 6.88.030 (1993); MINNEAPOLIS, 
MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 142.30 (1991); MULTNOMAH COUNTY, MD., ADOPTED 
DOCUMENTS, Ord. No. 948 § 27.352 (2000); NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., CODE § 3-241 (2000); 
OAKLAND, CA., CODE § 4.20.050 (2000); Petaluma, Cal., City Council, Minutes of Regular 
Meeting, at http://www.ci.petaluma.ca.us (last visited Jan. 4, 1999); PROVINCETOWN, MASS., 
GENERAL BY-LAWS § 7-3-1 (1998); ROCHESTER, N.Y., CODE § 47B-1 (2000); 
SACRAMENTO, CAL., MUN. CODE § 2.120.020 (2000); SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., MUN. CODE 
§ 62.3 (1990); SANTA BARBARA, CAL., COUNTY CODE § 42-2 (2001); SANTA MONICA, CAL., 
MUN. CODE § 4.60.030 (1995); SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 4.30.020 (1989); Tempe, 
Ariz., Human Resources, Domestic Partner Affidavit, at http://www.tempe.gov (last visited 
Mar. 9, 2001); City of Tumwater, Wash., Facts About Domestic Partnership Registration, at 
http://www.oly-wa.net/tumwater (last visited Mar. 10, 2001); WEST HOLLYWOOD, CAL., 
MUN. CODE § 2.84.030 (1996). 
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with the municipality’s human resource department.68 In Philadel-
phia, partners file an affidavit with the Commission on Human Rela-
tions.69 Two jurisdictions require that the parties sign their form in 
the presence of the clerk.70 Three jurisdictions also issue certificates 
to the parties after filing.71 
C. Definition 
The ways in which different jurisdictions define “domestic part-
ners” are substantially uniform. The definitions generally include the 
following: 
• a requirement that the parties be at least 18 years old.72 
• a specification that a domestic partnership involve only 
two persons.73 
 
 68. City of Los Angeles, Cal., Domestic Partner Information, at 
http://www.lacity.org/PEN/dppenfaq.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2001); MONTGOMERY 
COUNTY CODE OF ORDINANCES § 33-22 (again, Montgomery County allows for registration 
but does not require it); City of Northampton, Mass., Human Resources Department, Domes-
tic Partners—Family Health Insurance Benefit, at http://www.city.northampton.ma.us (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2001); PIMA COUNTY, ARIZ., MERIT POLICIES § 7-106 (2000). 
 69. PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE § 9-1106 (2000). 
 70. KEY WEST CODE OF ORDINANCES § 72.32; MARIN COUNTY CODE § 6.88.030. 
 71. MARIN COUNTY CODE § 6.88.030; CAMBRIDGE ORDINANCE § 2.119.050; NEW 
YORK CITY CODE § 3-244. 
 72. All but one of the ordinances contain this requirement. ALAMEDA COUNTY ADMIN. 
CODE § 3.20.170; Albuquerque Domestic Partners Policies & Procedures; ANN ARBOR CODE 
ch. 110, § 9:87; ATLANTA CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2-858; Berkeley, City Clerk, Domestic 
Partnership Information, at http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/clerk/forms/ 
domesticaffidavitform.pdf; BROWARD COUNTY CODE OF ORDINANCES § 16½-153; 
CAMBRIDGE ORDINANCE § 2.119.020; IOWA CITY CODE ch. 6 § 2-6-2; ITHACA CODE § 
215-21; KEY WEST CODE OF ORDINANCES § 72.31; KING COUNTY CODE § 3.12.010; 
LAGUNA BEACH MUN. CODE § 1.12.010; City of Los Angeles, Domestic Partner Information, 
at http://www.lacity.org/PEN/dppenfaq.htm; LOS ANGELES COUNTY CODE § 2.210.020; 
MADISON MUN. CODE § 3.23(2); MARIN COUNTY CODE § 6.88.020; MINNEAPOLIS CODE 
OF ORDINANCES § 142.20; MONTGOMERY COUNTY CODE OF ORDINANCES § 33-22 (1999); 
MULTNOMAH COUNTY ADOPTED DOCUMENTS, Ord. No. 948 § 27.352; NEW YORK CITY 
CODE § 3-241; City of Northampton, Mass., Human Resources Department, Domestic Part-
ners—Family Health Insurance Benefit, at http://www.city.northampton.ma.us (last visited 
Oct. 26, 2001); OAKLAND CODE § 4.20.050; PHILADELPHIA CODE § 9-1106; ROCHESTER 
CODE § 47B-1; SACRAMENTO MUN. CODE § 2.120.010; SAN FRANCISCO MUN. CODE § 
62.2; SANTA BARBARA COUNTY CODE § 42-2; SANTA MONICA MUN. CODE § 4.60.020; 
SEATTLE MUN. CODE § 4.30.020; Tempe, Human Resources, Domestic Partner Affidavit, at 
http://www.tempe.gov; City of Tumwater, Facts About Domestic Partnership Registration, at 
http://www.olywa.net/tumwater; WEST HOLLYWOOD MUN. CODE § 2.84.010. 
 73. All but two of the ordinances contain this requirement. ALAMEDA COUNTY, CAL., 
ADMIN. CODE § 3.20.170 (2000); Albuquerque Domestic Partners Policies & Procedures; 
ANN ARBOR CODE ch. 110, § 9:87; ATLANTA CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2-858; Berkeley, City 
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• a specification that neither party can be married.74 
• a requirement that the parties share joint responsibility 
for expenses (sometimes phrased as sharing the “com-
mon necessities of life”).75 
 
Clerk, Domestic Partnership Information, at http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/ 
clerk/forms/domesticaffidavitform.pdf; BROWARD COUNTY CODE OF ORDINANCES § 16½-
153; CAMBRIDGE ORDINANCE § 2.119.020; IOWA CITY CODE ch. 6 § 2-6-2; ITHACA CODE § 
215-21; KEY WEST CODE OF ORDINANCES § 72.31; KING COUNTY CODE § 3.12.010; 
LAGUNA BEACH MUN. CODE § 1.12.010; City of Los Angeles, Domestic Partner Information, 
at http://www.lacity.org/PEN/dppenfaq.htm; LOS ANGELES COUNTY CODE § 2.210.020; 
MADISON MUN. CODE § 3.23(2); MINNEAPOLIS CODE OF ORDINANCES § 142.20; 
MONTGOMERY COUNTY CODE OF ORDINANCES § 33-22; MULTNOMAH COUNTY ADOPTED 
DOCUMENTS, Ord. No. 948 § 27.352; NEW YORK CITY CODE § 3-241; City of Northamp-
ton, Human Resources Department, Domestic Partners—Family Health Insurance Benefit, at 
http://www.city.northampton.ma.us; OAKLAND CODE § 4.20.050; PHILADELPHIA CODE § 
9-1106; PROVINCETOWN, MASS., GENERAL BY-LAWS § 7-2-1 (1998); ROCHESTER CODE § 
47B-1; SACRAMENTO MUN. CODE § 2.120.010; SAN FRANCISCO MUN. CODE § 62.2; SANTA 
BARBARA COUNTY CODE § 42-2; SANTA MONICA MUN. CODE § 4.60.020; SEATTLE MUN. 
CODE § 4.30.020; City of Tumwater, Facts About Domestic Partnership Registration, at 
http://www.olywa.net/tumwater; WEST HOLLYWOOD MUN. CODE § 2.84.010. 
 74. All but three of the ordinances contain this requirement. ALAMEDA COUNTY 
ADMIN. CODE § 3.20.170; Albuquerque, Domestic Partners Policies & Procedures; ANN 
ARBOR CODE ch. 110, § 9:87; ATLANTA CODE OF ORDINANCES §2-858; Berkeley, City 
Clerk, Domestic Partnership Information, at http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/clerk/forms/ 
domesticaffidavitform.pdf; BROWARD COUNTY CODE OF ORDINANCES § 16 ½-153; 
CAMBRIDGE ORDINANCE § 2.119.020; IOWA CITY CODE ch. 6 § 2-6-2; ITHACA CODE § 
215-21; KEY WEST CODE OF ORDINANCES § 72.31; KING COUNTY CODE § 3.12.010; City of 
Los Angeles, Domestic Partner Information, at http://www.lacity.org/PEN/dppenfaq.htm; 
MADISON MUN. CODE § 3.23(2); MARIN COUNTY CODE § 6.88.020; MINNEAPOLIS CODE 
OF ORDINANCES § 142.20; MONTGOMERY COUNTY CODE OF ORDINANCES § 33-22; 
MULTNOMAH COUNTY ADOPTED DOCUMENTS, Ord. No. 948 § 27.352(2); NEW YORK CITY 
CODE § 3-241; City of Northampton, Human Resources Department, Domestic Partners—
Family Health Insurance Benefit, at http://www.city.north-ampton.ma.us; OAKLAND CODE § 
4.20.050; PHILADELPHIA CODE § 9-1106; PROVINCETOWN GENERAL BY-LAWS § 7-2-1; 
ROCHESTER CODE § 47B-1; SACRAMENTO MUN. CODE § 2.120.010; SAN FRANCISCO MUN. 
CODE § 62.2; SANTA MONICA MUN. CODE § 4.60.020; SEATTLE MUN. CODE §4.30.020; 
Tempe, Human Resources, Domestic Partner Affidavit, at http://www.tempe.gov; City of 
Tumwater, Facts About Domestic Partnership Registration, at 
http://www.olywa.net/tumwater; WEST HOLLYWOOD MUN. CODE § 2.84.010. In Madison, 
the parties can be married to each other. MADISON MUN. CODE § 3.23(2). 
 75. All but six of the ordinances contain this requirement. ALAMEDA COUNTY ADMIN. 
CODE § 3.20.170; Albuquerque, Domestic Partners Policies & Procedures; ANN ARBOR CODE 
ch. 110, § 9:87; ATLANTA CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2-858; Berkeley, City Clerk, Domestic 
Partnership Information, at http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/clerk/forms/ 
domesticaffidavitform.pdf; BROWARD COUNTY CODE OF ORDINANCES § 16½-153; IOWA 
CITY CODE ch. 6 § 2-6-2; ITHACA CODE § 215-21; KEY WEST CODE OF ORDINANCES § 
72.31; KING COUNTY CODE § 3.12.010; LAGUNA BEACH MUN. CODE § 1.12.010; City of 
Los Angeles, Domestic Partner Information, at http://www.lacity.org/PEN/ 
dppenfaq.htm; MARIN COUNTY CODE § 6.88.020; MINNEAPOLIS CODE OF ORDINANCES § 
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• a provision that the parties not be related in a way that 
would prevent them from being married in the state.76 
Somewhat less common provisions include: 
• a requirement that the parties live together.77 
• a requirement that the parties be competent to consent 
 
142.20; MONTGOMERY COUNTY CODE OF ORDINANCES § 33-22; MULTNOMAH COUNTY 
ADOPTED DOCUMENTS, Ord. No. 948 § 27.352(1); City of Northampton, Human Resources 
Department, Domestic Partners—Family Health Insurance Benefit, at http://www.city. 
northampton.ma.us; OAKLAND CODE § 4.20.050; PHILADELPHIA CODE § 9-1106; 
PROVINCETOWN GENERAL BY-LAWS § 7-2-1; ROCHESTER CODE § 47B-1; SACRAMENTO 
MUN. CODE § 2.120.010; SAN FRANCISCO MUN. CODE § 62.2; SANTA MONICA MUN. 
CODE § 4.60.020; SEATTLE MUN. CODE § 4.30.020; Tempe, Human Resources, Domestic 
Partner Affidavit, at http://www.tempe.gov; WEST HOLLYWOOD MUN. CODE § 2.84.010. 
 76. All but five of the ordinances contain this requirement. ALAMEDA COUNTY ADMIN. 
CODE § 3.20.170; Albuquerque, Domestic Partners Policies & Procedures; ANN ARBOR CODE 
ch. 110, § 9:87; ATLANTA CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2-858; Berkeley, City Clerk, Domestic 
Partnership Information, at http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/clerk/forms/ 
domesticaffidavitform.pdf; BROWARD COUNTY CODE OF ORDINANCES § 16½-153; 
CAMBRIDGE ORDINANCE § 2.119.020; IOWA CITY CODE ch. 6 § 2-6-2; ITHACA CODE § 
215-21; KEY WEST CODE OF ORDINANCES § 72.31; KING COUNTY CODE § 3.12.010; 
LAGUNA BEACH MUN. CODE § 1.12.010; LOS ANGELES COUNTY CODE § 2.210.020; MARIN 
COUNTY CODE § 6.88.020; MINNEAPOLIS CODE OF ORDINANCES § 142.20; MONTGOMERY 
COUNTY CODE OF ORDINANCES § 33-22; MULTNOMAH COUNTY ADOPTED DOCUMENTS, 
Ord. No. 948 § 27.352(4); NEW YORK CITY CODE § 3-241; City of Northampton, Human 
Resources Department, Domestic Partners—Family Health Insurance Benefit, at 
http://www.city.northampton.ma.us; OAKLAND CODE § 4.20.050; PHILADELPHIA CODE § 
9-1106; PROVINCETOWN GENERAL BY-LAWS § 7-2-1; SACRAMENTO MUN. CODE § 
2.120.010; SAN FRANCISCO MUN. CODE § 62.2; SANTA MONICA MUN. CODE § 4.60.020; 
SEATTLE MUN. CODE § 4.30.020; Tempe, Human Resources, Domestic Partner Affidavit, at 
http://www.tempe.gov; City of Tumwater, Facts About Domestic Partnership Registration, at 
http://www.olywa.net/tumwater; WEST HOLLYWOOD MUN. CODE § 2.84.010. In two mu-
nicipalities, the requirement is that the parties cannot be related “by blood.” BROWARD 
COUNTY CODE OF ORDINANCES § 16½-153; City of Los Angeles, Domestic Partner Informa-
tion, at http://www.lacity.org/PEN/dppenfaq.htm. 
 77. All but ten of the ordinances contain this requirement. ALAMEDA COUNTY ADMIN. 
CODE § 3.20.170; Albuquerque, Domestic Partners Policies & Procedures; ATLANTA CODE 
OF ORDINANCES § 2-858; Berkeley, City Clerk, Domestic Partnership Information, at 
http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/clerk/forms/do-mesticaffidavitform.pdf; CAM-BRIDGE 
ORDINANCE § 2.119.020; ITHACA CODE § 215-21; KING COUNTY CODE § 3.12.010; City of 
Los Angeles, Domestic Partner Information, at http://www.lacity.org/ 
PEN/dppenfaq.htm; MADISON MUN. CODE § 3.23(2); MARIN COUNTY CODE § 6.88.020; 
MONTGOMERY COUNTY CODE OF ORDINANCES § 33-22; MULTNOMAH COUNTY ADOPTED 
DOCUMENTS, Ord. No. 948 § 27.352(1); NEW YORK CITY CODE § 3-241; City of North-
ampton, Human Resources Department, Domestic Partners—Family Health Insurance Benefit, 
at http://www.city.northampton.ma.us; OAKLAND CODE § 4.20.050; PHILADELPHIA CODE 
§ 9-1106; ROCHESTER CODE § 47B-1; SACRAMENTO MUN. CODE § 2.120.010; SAN 
FRANCISCO MUN. CODE § 62.2; SANTA MONICA MUN. CODE § 4.60.020; SEATTLE MUN. 
CODE § 4.30.020; Tempe, Human Resources, Domestic Partner Affidavit, at 
http://www.tempe.gov. 
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to the arrangement.78 
 Nearly every municipality with a domestic partnership law al-
lows—either explicitly or implicitly by not specifying gender re-
quirements of partners—both same-sex and opposite-sex couples to 
register as domestic partners.79 Montgomery County and Philadel-
phia allow only same-sex couples to register.80 
Three of the jurisdictions specify that there must be free consent 
of the parties involved.81 
Over half of the jurisdictions include some sort of requirement 
 
 78. All but eleven of the ordinances contain this requirement. ALAMEDA COUNTY 
ADMIN. CODE § 3.20.170; ANN ARBOR CODE ch. 110, § 9:87; ATLANTA CODE OF 
ORDINANCES § 2-858; Berkeley, City Clerk, Domestic Partnership Information, at 
http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/clerk/forms/domesticaffidavitform.pdf; BROWARD COUNTY 
CODE OF ORDINANCES § 16½-153; CAMBRIDGE ORDINANCE § 2.119.020; IOWA CITY CODE 
ch. 6 § 2-6-2; ITHACA CODE § 215-21; KEY WEST CODE OF ORDINANCES § 72.31; KING 
COUNTY CODE § 3.12.010; LAGUNA BEACH MUN. CODE § 1.12.010; MADISON MUN. 
CODE § 3.23(2); MINNEAPOLIS CODE OF ORDINANCES § 142.20; MONTGOMERY COUNTY 
CODE OF ORDINANCES § 33-22; City of Northampton, Mass., Human Resources Depart-
ment, Domestic Partners—Family Health Insurance Benefit, at 
http://www.city.northampton.ma.us (last visited Oct. 26, 2001); OAKLAND CODE § 
4.20.050; PHILADELPHIA CODE § 9-1106; PROVINCETOWN GENERAL BY-LAWS § 7-2-1; 
ROCHESTER CODE § 47B-1; SACRAMENTO MUN. CODE § 2.120.010; SEATTLE MUN. CODE 
§ 4.30.020; WEST HOLLYWOOD MUN. CODE § 2.84.010. 
 79. ALAMEDA COUNTY ADMIN. CODE § 3.20.170; Albuquerque Domestic Partners 
Policies & Procedures; ANN ARBOR CODE ch. 110, § 9:87; ATLANTA CODE OF ORDINANCES 
§ 2-858; Berkeley, City Clerk, Domestic Partnership Information, at 
http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/clerk/forms/domesticaffidavitform.pdf; BROWARD COUNTY 
CODE OF ORDINANCES § 16½-153; CAMBRIDGE ORDINANCE § 2.119.020; IOWA CITY CODE 
ch. 6 § 2-6-2; ITHACA CODE § 215-21; KEY WEST CODE OF ORDINANCES § 72.31; KING 
COUNTY CODE § 3.12.010; LAGUNA BEACH MUN. CODE § 1.12.010; City of Los Angeles, 
Domestic Partner Information, at http://www.lacity.org/PEN/dppenfaq.htm; LOS ANGELES 
COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 2.210.020 (1999); MADISON MUN. CODE § 3.23(2); MARIN 
COUNTY CODE § 6.88.020; MINNEAPOLIS CODE OF ORDINANCES § 142.20; MULTNOMAH 
COUNTY ADOPTED DOCUMENTS, Ord. No. 948; NEW YORK CITY CODE § 3-241; City of 
Northampton, Human Resources Department, Domestic Partners—Family Health Insurance 
Benefit, at http://www.city.northampton.ma.us; OAKLAND CODE § 4.20.050; 
PROVINCETOWN GENERAL BY-LAWS § 7-2-1; ROCHESTER CODE § 47B-1; SACRAMENTO 
MUN. CODE § 2.120.010; SAN FRANCISCO MUN. CODE § 62.2; SANTA BARBARA, CAL., 
COUNTY CODE § 42-2 (2001); SANTA MONICA, CAL., MUN. CODE § 4.60.020 (1995); 
SEATTLE MUN. CODE § 4.30.020; Tempe, Human Resources, Domestic Partner Affidavit, at 
http://www.tempe.gov; City of Tumwater, Facts About Domestic Partnership Registration, at 
http://www.oly-wa.net/tumwater; WEST HOLLYWOOD MUN. CODE § 2.84.010. 
 80. MONTGOMERY COUNTY CODE OF ORDINANCES § 33-22; PHILADELPHIA CODE § 
9-1106. 
 81. City of Los Angeles, Domestic Partner Information, at 
http://www.lacity.org/PEN/dppenfaq.htm; MONTGOMERY COUNTY CODE OF 
ORDINANCES § 33-22; SACRAMENTO MUN. CODE § 2.120.010. 
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that the parties be engaged in an intimate relationship. This is gener-
ally designated as a relationship of “mutual support, caring and 
commitment.”82 Another common description is a “close and com-
mitted personal relationship” or some variation of that theme.83 It is 
not clear whether this “intimacy” requirement means a sexual 
relationship, although that seems to be the implication. Some 
describe the relationship by reference to marriage. For instance, 
Albuquerque requires a “mutual commitment similar to marriage.”84 
The requirement in Minneapolis is that the parties be “committed to 
one another to the same extent as married persons are to each other, 
except for the traditional marital status and solemnities.”85 
Northampton requires an “exclusive mutual commitment similar to 
that of marriage.”86 Los Angeles County’s law describes an “intimate 
and committed relationship of mutual caring,”87 and Santa Monica’s 
law is substantially the same.88 San Francisco’s law states that the 
parties will have “chosen to share one another’s lives in an intimate 
and committed relationship of mutual caring . . . .”89 Two cities 
reference “family”: Cambridge requires that the parties “consider 
themselves to be a family”;90 Key West is similar in requiring that the 
partners “consider themselves to be members of each other’s 
immediate family” and that they have “chosen to share one another’s 
lives in a family relationship.”91 Madison’s description employs both 
positive (“relationship is of a permanent and distinct domestic 
character”) and negative (“not in a relationship that is merely 
 
 82. Albuquerque Domestic Partners Policies & Procedures; ANN ARBOR CODE ch. 110, 
§ 9:87; CAMBRIDGE ORDINANCE § 2.119.020; IOWA CITY CODE ch. 6 § 2-6-2; ITHACA 
CODE § 215-21; MADISON MUN. CODE § 3.23(2); PROVINCETOWN GENERAL BY-LAWS § 7-
2-1; City of Tumwater, Facts About Domestic Partnership Registration, at 
http://www.olywa.net/tumwater. 
 83. ATLANTA CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2-858; KING COUNTY CODE § 3.12.010; 
MONTGOMERY COUNTY CODE OF ORDINANCES § 33-22; NEW YORK CITY CODE § 3-241; 
SEATTLE MUN. CODE § 4.30.020. 
 84. Albuquerque Domestic Partners Policies & Procedures. 
 85. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 142.20 (1991). 
 86. City of Northampton, Mass., Human Resources Department, Domestic Partners—
Family Health Insurance Benefit, at http://www.city.northampton.ma.us (last visited Oct. 26, 
2001). 
 87. City of Los Angeles, Cal., Domestic Partner Information, at 
http://www.lacity.org/PEN/dppenfaq.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2001). 
 88. SANTA MONICA, CAL., MUN. CODE § 4.60.020 (1995). 
 89. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., MUN. CODE § 62.2 (1990). 
 90. CAMBRIDGE, MASS., ORDINANCE § 2.119.020 (1992). 
 91. KEY WEST, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 72.31 (1998). 
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negative (“not in a relationship that is merely temporary, social, po-
litical, commercial or economic in nature”) elements.92 Rochester 
wants the partners to be “committed to the physical, emotional and 
financial care and support of each other.”93 
D. Benefits 
A wide variety of benefits are available to domestic partners in 
the various jurisdictions. Some provisions, however, are merely sym-
bolic and do not provide the basis for any specific benefits. Five mu-
nicipalities offer to domestic partners all of the benefits extended to 
married spouses of public employees.94 Eleven provide health insur-
ance coverage for partners of public employees.95 Eight allow part-
ners to have hospital visitation,96 and five provide for visitation in 
jails.97 Eight municipalities allow public employees to have sick or 
bereavement leave on the illness or death of a partner or partner’s 
family member.98 Provincetown and Cambridge allow for access to 
 
 92. MADISON, WIS., MUN. CODE § 3.23(2) (1998). 
 93. ROCHESTER, N.Y., CODE § 47B-1 (2000). 
 94. Berkeley, Cal., City Clerk, Domestic Partnership Information, at 
http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/clerk/forms/domesticaffidavitform.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 
2001); CAMBRIDGE ORDINANCE § 2.119.070; ITHACA, N.Y., CODE § 215-27 (2000); KEY 
WEST CODE OF ORDINANCES § 72.35; MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE OF 
ORDINANCES § 33-22 (1999). 
 95. ALAMEDA COUNTY, CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 3.64.030 (2000); Albuquerque, N.M., 
Domestic Partners Policies & Procedures (on file with author); ATLANTA, GA., CODE OF 
ORDINANCES § 2-858 (2000); BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 16½-156 
(1999); Town of Eastchester, N.Y., Town Board Minutes (Sept. 9, 2000) (on file with au-
thor); ITHACA CODE § 215-27; KING COUNTY, WASH., CODE § 3.12.040 (1998); City of Los 
Angeles, Cal., Domestic Partner Information, at http://www.lacity.org/PEN/dppenfaq.htm 
(last visited Mar. 9, 2001); City of Northampton, Mass., Human Resources Department, Do-
mestic Partners—Family Health Insurance Benefit, at http://www.city.northampton.ma.us 
(last visited Oct. 26, 2001); PHILADELPHIA, PA., CITY CODE § 9-1106 (2000); PIMA 
COUNTY, ARIZ., MERIT POLICIES § 7-106 (2000); Tempe, Ariz., Human Resources, Domestic 
Partner Affidavit, at http://www.tempe.gov (last visited Mar. 9, 2001). 
 96. CAMBRIDGE, MASS., ORDINANCE § 2.119.060 (1992); LAGUNA BEACH, CAL., 
MUN. CODE § 1.12.070 (1992); MARIN COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 6.88.070 (1993); 
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 142.70 (1991); NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., 
CODE § 3-244 (2000); PROVINCETOWN, MASS., GENERAL BY-LAWS § 7-6-1 (1998); 
SACRAMENTO, CAL., MUN. CODE § 2.120.080 (2000); WEST HOLLYWOOD, CAL., MUN. 
CODE § 2.84.070 (1998). 
 97. ATLANTA CODE OF ORDINANCES § 94-135; CAMBRIDGE ORDINANCE § 
2.119.060; LAGUNA BEACH MUN. CODE § 1.12.080; PROVINCETOWN GENERAL BY-LAWS § 
7-6-2; WEST HOLLYWOOD MUN. CODE § 2.84.080. 
 98. ALAMEDA COUNTY ADMIN. CODE § 3.20.120; Albuquerque Domestic Partners 
Policies & Procedures; CAMBRIDGE ORDINANCE § 2.119.070; LOS ANGELES COUNTY, CAL., 
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the school records of a partner’s child if the guardian partner has 
written a letter to the school allowing such access.99 Oakland and 
Philadelphia provide an exemption from taxes on property transfers 
between the parties.100 New York allows partners to have a right of 
succession in public housing.101 The City of Los Angeles provides 
survivor pensions for surviving partners of deceased employees.102 In 
Sacramento, domestic partners are given authority to establish con-
tractual duties between the parties in writing.103 The term “family” in 
real estate documents in Sacramento is also defined to include do-
mestic partners.104 
E. Termination 
The most common provision in domestic partnership statutes 
provides for termination upon the death of one of the parties or by a 
statement or affidavit filed with the clerk.105 Tempe requires a state-
 
CODE § 2.210.080 (1999); NEW YORK CITY CODE § 3-244; PIMA COUNTY MERIT POLICIES 
§ 7-106; SACRAMENTO MUN. CODE § 2.120.070; SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 4.30.010 
(1989). 
 99. CAMBRIDGE ORDINANCE § 2.119.060; PROVINCETOWN GENERAL BY-LAWS § 7-6-
3. 
 100. OAKLAND, CAL., CODE § 4.20.050 (2000); PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE § 19-1405 
(2000). 
 101. NEW YORK CITY CODE § 3-244. 
 102. City of Los Angeles, Cal., Domestic Partner Information, at 
http://www.lacity.org/PEN/dppenfaq.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2001). 
 103. SACRAMENTO MUN. CODE § 2.120.030. 
 104. Id. § 2.120.060. 
 105. ALAMEDA COUNTY, CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 3.20.170 (2000); Albuquerque, N.M., 
Domestic Partners Policies & Procedures (on file with author); ANN ARBOR, MICH., CODE ch. 
110, § 9:89 (2001); ATLANTA, GA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 94-136 (2000); Berkeley, Cal., 
City Clerk, Domestic Partnership Information, at 
http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/clerk/forms/domesticaffidavitform.pdf (last visited Sept., 
2001); BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 16½-154 (1999); CAMBRIDGE, 
MASS., ORDINANCE § 2.119.030 (1992); Town of Eastchester, N.Y., Town Board Minutes 
(Sept. 9, 2000) (on file with author); IOWA CITY, IOWA, CODE ch. 6 § 2-6-4 (1994); ITHACA, 
N.Y., CODE § 215-22 (2000); KEY WEST, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 72.33 (1998); 
KING COUNTY, WASH., CODE § 3.12.044 (1998); LAGUNA BEACH, CAL., MUN. CODE § 
1.12.010 (1992); City of Los Angeles, Domestic Partner Information, at 
http://www.cityoflaw.org; LOS ANGELES COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 2.210.030 (1999); 
MADISON, WIS., MUN. CODE § 3.23(10)(d) (1998); MARIN COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 
6.88.040 (1993); MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 142.60 (1991); 
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 33-22 (1999); MULTNOMAH 
COUNTY, OR., ADOPTED DOCUMENTS, Ord. No. 948 (2000); NEW YORK CITY CODE § 3-
242; OAKLAND CODE § 4.20.050; Petaluma, Cal., City Council, Minutes of Regular Meeting, 
at http://www.ci.petaluma.ca.us (last visited Mar. 10, 2001); PROVINCETOWN, MASS., 
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ment to its Human Resources Department.106 Philadelphia requires a 
statement to the Commission on Human Relations.107 Some 
municipalities presumably require a statement to the person with 
whom the partnership was registered.108 Six of the municipalities 
provide for termination if one of the parties marries.109 If the parties 
end their cohabitation, the partnership terminates in four 
jurisdictions.110 A partnership can be terminated if one party gives 
notice to the other partner in six jurisdictions.111 In another five 
municipalities, a change in the circumstances that initially justified 
the partnership suffices to terminate it.112 
F. Policies Toward Private Employers 
Only San Francisco requires that all private employers who con-
tract with the jurisdiction offer domestic partnership benefits to their 
employees.113 Sacramento’s law requires private employers to allow 
family leave for domestic partners if they allow such leave for married 
 
GENERAL BY-LAWS § 7-3-3 (1998); ROCHESTER, N.Y., CODE § 47B-2 (2000); SACRAMENTO 
MUN. CODE § 2.120.040; SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., MUN. CODE § 62.4 (1990); SANTA 
BARBARA, CAL., COUNTY CODE § 42-3 (2001); SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 4.30.030 
(1989); Tempe, Ariz., Human Resources, Domestic Partner Affidavit, at 
http://www.tempe.gov (last visited Mar. 9, 2001); City of Tumwater, Wash., Facts About 
Domestic Partnership Registration, at http://www.oly-wa.net/tumwater (last visited Mar. 10, 
2001); WEST HOLLYWOOD, CAL., MUN. CODE § 2.84.020 (1998). 
 106. Tempe, Human Resources, Domestic Partner Affidavit, at http://www.tempe.gov. 
 107. PHILADELPHIA CODE § 9-1106. 
 108. These are the ordinances of Eastchester, Northampton, Santa Monica, and Pima 
County. 
 109. ANN ARBOR CODE ch. 110, § 9:89; BROWARD COUNTY CODE OF ORDINANCES § 
16½-154; City of Los Angeles, Domestic Partner Information, at 
http://www.lacity.org/PEN/dppenfaq.htm; MARIN COUNTY CODE § 6.88.040; NEW YORK 
CITY CODE § 3-242; SAN FRANCISCO MUN. CODE § 62.4. 
 110. City of Los Angeles, Domestic Partner Information, at 
http://www.lacity.org/PEN/dppenfaq.htm; MARIN COUNTY CODE § 6.88.040; 
SACRAMENTO MUN. CODE § 2.120.040; SAN FRANCISCO MUN. CODE § 62.4. 
 111. ATLANTA, GA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 94-136 (2000); ITHACA, N.Y., CODE § 
215-22 (2000); City of Los Angeles, Domestic Partner Information, at 
http://www.lacity.org/PEN/dppenfaq.htm; LOS ANGELES COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 
2.210.030 (1999); MARIN COUNTY CODE § 6.88.040; SACRAMENTO MUN. CODE § 
2.120.040; SAN FRANCISCO MUN. CODE § 62.4. 
 112. Albuquerque, N.M., Domestic Partners Policies & Procedures (on file with author); 
ATLANTA CODE OF ORDINANCES § 94-136; IOWA CITY, IOWA, CODE ch. 6 § 2-6-4 (1994); 
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 142.60 (1991); MONTGOMERY COUNTY, 
MD., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 33-19 (1999). 
 113. SAN FRANCISCO MUN. CODE § 12B-1. 
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spouses.114 
G. Recognition of “Foreign” Domestic Partners 
Four jurisdictions provide that domestic partnerships registered 
in another place will be recognized in those jurisdictions.115 By con-
trast, ten municipalities require that at least one partner be a resident 
or employee of the jurisdiction.116 The recognition or nonrecogni-
tion of partnerships registered in other jurisdictions is important be-
cause parties to a domestic partnership may want to assert rights 
based on their status as partners when they move from the jurisdic-
tion in which their partnership was registered. Where there is provi-
sion for “foreign” recognition, partners may be able to do so. Where 
there is not such provision, individuals cannot assert rights based on 
their status as partners, but it is not unlikely that the refusal of one 
jurisdiction to recognize a domestic partnership from another would 
lead to litigation. 
H. Other Provisions 
A number of municipalities require that once a domestic partner-
ship has been terminated, the partners must wait six months (or 
sometimes a shorter period) before entering another partnership (al-
though exception is sometimes made where the termination occurs 
due to the death of one of the partners).117 Provincetown and Sac-
ramento have provisions that forbid discrimination on the basis of 
domestic partnerships, but the Sacramento law specifies that it is to 
 
 114. SACRAMENTO MUN. CODE § 2.120.070. 
 115. CAMBRIDGE, MASS., ORDINANCE § 2.119.090 (1992); KEY WEST, FLA., CODE OF 
ORDINANCES § 72.36 (1998); OAKLAND, CAL., CITY CODE § 4.20.050 (2000) (requiring the 
partnership to have been in effect for a year before recognition is sought); WEST HOLLYWOOD, 
CAL., MUN. CODE § 2.84.100 (1998). 
 116. BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 16½-153 (1999); IOWA CITY 
CODE ch. 6 § 2-6-3; KING COUNTY, WASH., CODE § 3.12.010 (1998); MARIN COUNTY 
CODE § 6.88.030; MINNEAPOLIS CODE OF ORDINANCES § 142.40; NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., 
CODE § 3-241 (2000); SACRAMENTO MUN. CODE § 2.120.020; SAN FRANCISCO MUN. 
CODE § 62.3; SANTA BARBARA, CAL., COUNTY CODE § 42-2 (2001); City of Tumwater, 
Wash., Facts About Domestic Partnership Registration, at http://www.olywa.net/tum-water 
(last visited Mar. 10, 2001). 
 117. IOWA CITY CODE ch. 6 § 2-6-4; ITHACA, N.Y., CODE § 215-22 (2000); KEY WEST, 
FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 72.33 (1998); City of Los Angeles, Cal., Domestic Partner In-
formation, at http://www.lacity.org/PEN/dppenfaq.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2001); MARIN 
COUNTY CODE § 6.88.030; MULTNOMAH COUNTY, OR., ADOPTED DOCUMENTS, Ord. No. 
948 (2000); SACRAMENTO MUN. CODE § 2.120.020; SAN FRANCISCO MUN. CODE § 62.3. 
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be enforced by private action.118 In San Francisco, a domestic part-
nership ceremony can be performed.119 Santa Barbara County pro-
vides that a domestic partnership cannot be the basis for a cause of 
action.120 Seattle does not allow domestic partners to claim a right to 
the retirement benefits of their partners.121 In Tempe, the domestic 
partnership only lasts twelve months before it must be registered 
again.122 
IV. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE PROPOSAL 
Chapter 6 of the American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law 
of Family Dissolution (“Principles”) recommends that certain rights 
be made available to unmarried couples upon the dissolution of their 
relationship. This chapter defines “domestic partners” as “two per-
sons of the same or opposite sex, not married to one another, who 
for a significant period of time share a primary residence and a life 
together as a couple.”123 The Principles would give credence to regis-
tration under a municipal or state domestic partnership law in de-
termining whether to invoke its provisions on dissolution of the rela-
tionship.124 Perhaps most startling in this proposal is the fact that a 
couple can establish a domestic partnership even if one of the parties 
is married to someone else or if the relationship would have been in-
cestuous had it been a marriage!125 The Principles would provide to 
domestic partners many of the rights associated with divorce, includ-
ing concepts analogous to marital property, property division, and 
alimony.126 
In some ways, the ALI proposal does not resemble the domestic 
 
 118. PROVINCETOWN, MASS., GENERAL BY-LAWS § 7-7 (1998); SACRAMENTO MUN. 
CODE § 2.120.100. 
 119. SAN FRANCISCO MUN. CODE § 62.9. The ceremony can be performed by the 
County Clerk or any person who can perform a marriage under California law. Id. 
 120. SANTA BARBARA COUNTY CODE § 42-7. 
 121. SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 4.36.185 (1999). 
 122. Tempe, Ariz., Human Resources, Domestic Partner Affidavit, at 
http://www.tempe.gov (last visited Mar. 9, 2001). 
 123. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 19, § 6.01(1); see also id. § 6.03(1). 
 124. Id. § 6.03(7)(j). 
 125. Id. § 6.01(5); id. cmts. c, d; id. § 6.03(7)(k); id. cmt d. The Principles do contain a 
caveat that the claims of a domestic partnership should not compromise the marital claims of 
the spouse of the married partner, which alleviates some potential economic harm to the 
spouse but sends a novel message about the law’s view of adultery. 
 126. Id. §§ 6.04–.06. 
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partnership ordinances now in existence. This is true largely because 
of the different context of the ALI proposal and the existing domes-
tic partnership ordinances. The Principles deal with the dissolution of 
a relationship and impose on that relationship a status that the par-
ties may or may not have intended. The ordinances, on the other 
hand, provide an opportunity for couples to opt into a status. The 
Principles do not create a way to formalize a relationship and do not 
offer benefits to the couple during the existence of the relationship. 
Thus, while the existing ordinances do not create any ramifications 
for termination, that is the sole purpose of the ALI proposal. 
Despite the differences between the ALI proposal and the exist-
ing domestic partnership ordinances, there are some significant simi-
larities, particularly in the definitions of a domestic partnership. Both 
the Principles and the municipal ordinances limit a partnership to 
two persons. As with the majority of ordinances, the ALI proposal 
allows for both same-sex and opposite-sex couples to be recognized 
as domestic partners. Lastly, like the majority of municipal laws, the 
Principles require the partners to live together.127 
V. CRITIQUE 
There are significant concerns raised by the domestic partnership 
laws discussed above. This section will briefly address two categories 
of potential problems with the various laws and the ALI proposal: 
legal problems and public policy problems. 
A. Legal Issues 
Domestic partnership laws have been the subject of significant 
litigation, involving three kinds of scenarios: (1) businesses seeking 
clarification of ordinances, which raises preemption concerns, (2) tax-
payers challenging the laws, which raises authority concerns, and (3) 
attempts to have benefits mandated, which raises concerns about 
constitutional interpretation. There are also some other significant 
legal issues that have not yet been litigated but which will be ad-
dressed below. 
1. Preemption and regulation concerns 
The questions raised in the litigation by businesses have involved 
 
 127. Id. § 6.03(2). 
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a state’s or municipality’s authority to regulate the behavior of pri-
vate employers. For instance, in July 1997, five employers challenged 
the Hawaii reciprocal beneficiaries legislation, claiming that if the law 
were interpreted broadly, it would conflict with the federal Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”).128 U.S. District Judge 
David Ezra ruled that the law did not cover health maintenance or-
ganizations or mutual benefit societies, the subjects of the lawsuit, 
and left open the question of the law’s application to companies that 
contract with insurance companies.129 
Similar issues were raised in litigation involving the San Francisco 
domestic partnership ordinance, which prohibited the city from con-
tracting with companies that do not provide domestic partnership 
benefits to their employees’ partners equivalent to those offered to 
their employees’ spouses. Two airline trade organizations and Fed-
eral Express, all of which do business with the city through the San 
Francisco airport, filed suit, challenging the requirement that they 
offer domestic partnership benefits to their employees.130 Among 
plaintiffs’ arguments were a number of issues related to the regula-
tion of private employers, asserting that: (1) the ordinance violated 
the U.S. Constitution by regulating out-of-state conduct, (2) the 
ordinance was preempted by ERISA, (3) the ordinance was pre-
empted by the Airline Deregulation Act (“ADA”), and (4) the ordi-
nance was preempted by the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”).131 In that 
case, the court held that the ordinance unconstitutionally restricted 
interstate commerce to the extent that it applied to out-of-state con-
duct, thus significantly limiting the ordinance’s effect on the business 
of the airlines. The court did not, however, strike down the ordi-
nance altogether.132 Like the Hawaii case, the court held that the or-
dinance was preempted by ERISA, except as to benefits not covered 
by ERISA (i.e., moving expenses and travel benefits), so the ordi-
nance could not govern family medical and bereavement leave and 
health and pension benefits.133 The court held that the ordinance 
could not withstand the ADA challenge inasmuch as it “is applied in 
a manner that creates coercive economic incentives for air carriers to 
 
 128. See Coolidge, supra note 15, at 274–75 n.246. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Air Transp. Ass’n v. City of San Francisco, 992 F. Supp. 1149 (N.D. Cal. 1998). 
 131. Id. at 1155. 
 132. Id. at 1162–64. 
 133. Id. at 1180. 
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alter their routes,”134 but to the degree the ordinance did not do so, 
it was valid.135 On the RLA claim, the court held that because the 
ordinance acts as a bar on employer conduct regardless of union 
status of its employees, it does not affect collective bargaining 
agreements.136 Thus, the ordinance was severely limited, though not 
killed outright.137 
2. Authority concerns 
Since localities are legally creatures of the state, a locality needs 
state authority to pass an ordinance.138 Usually this authority is 
broad, but some state governments do not freely share power with 
their municipalities. In a number of states, taxpayers have filed suit, 
arguing that a locality did not have the authority to pass a domestic 
partnership ordinance. These suits have led to mixed results. 
In Minneapolis, taxpayers challenged the city’s adoption of an 
ordinance offering domestic partnership benefits to city employ-
ees.139 The court of appeals held that the state benefits statute limits 
the class of persons to whom municipalities may offer benefits. It fur-
ther concluded that domestic partners were outside the statutory 
limitation, that the extension of benefits was an issue of statewide 
concern, as was the matter of discrimination, and that because the 
city’s power was purely local, the ordinance was invalid.140 In a simi-
lar challenge to a policy of Arlington County, Virginia, the Virginia 
Supreme Court held that the Dillon Rule, which allows municipali-
ties to exercise only the powers expressly granted by the State Legis-
lature, was properly interpreted by the Virginia Attorney General in 
1997 to prohibit the extension of benefits to “domestic partners.” 
Central to the court’s holding was the finding that “domestic part-
ners” are not “dependents” as that term is used in the Virginia stat-
ute defining municipalities’ power regarding the extension of insur-
 
 134. Id. at 1188. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 1190. 
 137. In May 1999, the court revisited this case, but the ordinance survived unchanged 
from the previous ruling. Air Transp. Ass’n v. City of San Francisco, No. 97-01763 CW (May 
27, 1999); see also S.D. Myers, Inc. v. City of San Francisco, No. 97-04463 CW (May 27, 
1999) (reiterating some of the holdings of these cases). 
 138. See Arlington County v. White, 528 S.E.2d 706 (Va. 2000). 
 139. Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, 527 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). 
 140. Id. at 111–13. 
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ance benefits to employees.141 The majority concluded that the Gen-
eral Assembly contemplated that some financial dependence must be 
established to allow benefits to be extended, but that the Arlington 
County policy did not rely exclusively on financial dependence and, 
thus, went beyond the power the County could legitimately exer-
cise.142 
In an Illinois case, however, the court rejected plaintiffs’ chal-
lenge to a Chicago domestic partnership claim, holding that a do-
mestic partnership statute was not a marital statute, but rather an in-
surance law that could be validly enacted by the city as long as it was 
not expressly preempted by state law.143 A number of other legal chal-
lenges have similarly resulted in ordinances being upheld.144 
3. State constitutional concerns 
The lawsuits attempting to mandate domestic partnership bene-
fits through the courts have raised significant issues of state constitu-
tional interpretation. These cases raise the question of whether limit-
ing employment benefits to married couples violates state equal 
protection guarantees by discriminating based on the sex or “sexual 
orientation” of unmarried persons. 
In California, an employee challenged the denial of dental bene-
fits to his partner by the State Department of Personnel Administra-
tion, arguing that the term “spouse,” which was used to determine 
 
 141. Arlington County, 528 S.E.2d at 708–09. 
 142. Id. at 709. Three concurring and dissenting justices agreed that the County had 
violated the Dillon Rule but argued that the majority had missed the “fundamental issue”—
whether the County could confer recognition on common law marriages or “same-sex un-
ions.” They characterized the fundamental flaw in the County’s policy as follows: “The 
County’s expanded definition of eligible dependents is nothing more than a disguised effort to 
confer health benefits upon persons who are involved in either common law marriages or 
‘same-sex unions,’ which are not recognized in this Commonwealth and are violative of the 
public policy of this Commonwealth.” Id. at 713 (Hassell, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 143. Crawford v. Chicago, 710 N.E.2d 91 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). 
 144. Schaefer v. Denver, 973 P.2d 717, 718–19 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998), cert. denied, 
(Colo. 1999); Slattery v. New York, 686 N.Y.S.2d 683 (Sup. Ct. 1999); Atlanta v. Morgan, 
492 S.E.2d 193, 194 (Ga. 1997); Lowe v. Broward County, 766 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2000); Arthur H. Rotstein, Judge OKs Benefits for Partners, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, March 15, 
1998, at B3; Anne Blythe, Court Upholds Towns’ Domestic-Partners Laws, NEWS & OBSERVER 
(Raleigh, NC), May 9, 2000, at B5; Jacks v. Santa Barbara, available at 
http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/pages/cases/record?-record=83>; Jo Becker, Domestic 
Partner Policy Expanded in Montgomery, WASH. POST, June 27, 2001, at B1; Judge Upholds 
City’s Domestic-Partner Benefits, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 16, 2000, at 6B. 
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to whom benefits were available, was a classification based on sexual 
orientation and should therefore be viewed as suspect under Califor-
nia’s equal protection clause.145 Explaining that the department pol-
icy distinguished solely between married and unmarried employees 
rather than between heterosexual and homosexual employees, the 
court failed to identify “any classification at all which is the subject of 
discrimination.”146 The court also noted that it was “unable to estab-
lish the nature of a homosexual ‘family’ on the basis of any natural, 
intrinsic or legal foundation.”147 Since the class of unmarried persons 
was not suspect, statutory distinctions based upon marital status 
needed only to be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. 
Citing the state’s “legitimate interest in promoting marriage,” the 
court rejected the discrimination claim, stating that “[t]he state’s 
public policy favoring marriage is promoted by conferring statutory 
rights upon married persons which are not afforded unmarried part-
ners.”148 
In Wisconsin, the State Personnel Commission dismissed an em-
ployee’s discrimination complaint based on an administrative denial 
of her request for family health insurance coverage for her partner.149 
Her claim, based on a state discrimination statute and the Wisconsin 
constitution, was also denied by the trial court, which affirmed the 
Commission’s decision.150 The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding 
that the decision not to extend benefits did not rely on a classifica-
tion based on gender or sexual orientation, but rather on marital 
status, so there was no constitutional claim.151 
In Colorado, an employee challenged a decision by the state Ca-
reer Services Board to deny her sick leave to take care of her domes-
tic partner. The decision was based on an administrative rule that al-
lowed for sick leave only to care for a member of the employee’s 
“immediate family.”152 The plaintiff claimed that because the rule’s 
definition of “immediate family” did not include a same-sex partner, 
 
 145. Hinman v. Dep’t of Pers. Admin., 167 Cal. App. 3d 516, 524 (Ct. App. 1985). 
 146. Id. at 526. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 527. 
 149. Phillips v. Wis. Pers. Comm’n, 482 N.W.2d 121, 123 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 129. 
 152. Ross v. Denver Dep’t of Health and Hosp., 883 P.2d 516, 518 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1994). 
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the law created a classification of persons who are denied sick leave 
benefits on the basis of sexual orientation, thus violating the Colo-
rado Constitution.153 The court held that the rule in question did 
not differentiate between heterosexual and homosexual employees 
but rather between married and unmarried employees: 
Ross was not denied family sick leave benefits to care for her 
same-sex partner because she is homosexual. An unmarried hetero-
sexual employee also would not be permitted to take family sick 
leave benefits to care for his or her unmarried opposite-sex partner. 
Thus, the rule does not treat homosexual employees and similarly 
situated heterosexual employees differently.154 
Therefore, there was no violation of the State constitution.155 
Recently, the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court rul-
ing that public employers who offer spousal benefits to employees 
must provide domestic partnership benefits to  
homosexual persons meeting certain requirements. In order to qual-
ify, the employees must not be related by blood or be closer in de-
gree of relationship than first cousins. They must not have been le-
gally married and must have continuously lived together in an 
exclusive and loving relationship that they intend to maintain for the 
rest of their lives. They must share financial responsibilities and 
demonstrate that they would be married to each other if Oregon law 
permitted it. They must not have other domestic partners, and, fi-
nally, must be eighteen years of age or older.156 
In the section of the opinion regarding Oregon constitutional 
law, the court applied a two-step analysis to determine, first, whether 
the plaintiffs were part of a “true class” and, second, whether they 
were part of a “suspect class.” Same-sex couples are clearly “defined 
in terms of ad hominem, personal and social characteristics,” so to 
the court, they are a “true class.”157 In other words, their identity as 
 
 153. Id. at 518. 
 154. Id. at 520. 
 155. Id. at 521. The court also noted that the underlying claim was that the marriage law 
was unfair but noted that the decision to change that law must be left to the legislature. Id. at 
520. 
 156. Tanner v. Or. Health Sci. Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 439 (Or. Ct. App. 1998). For more 
on this case, see David Orgon Coolidge & William C. Duncan, Marriage and Democracy in 
Oregon: The Meaning and Implications of Tanner v. Oregon Health Sciences University, 36 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 503 (2000). 
 157. Tanner, 971 P.2d at 447. 
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a class is not an artificial legal construct, but is something that exists 
outside the structure of legal classifications.158 
The court then analyzed whether or not the class was a suspect 
class. The court held that there was no requirement of an immutable 
trait (or traits) to establish a suspect class, adopting instead the stan-
dard that the class must have characteristics that have been “histori-
cally regarded as defining distinct, socially-recognized groups that 
have been the subject of adverse social or political stereotyping or 
prejudice.”159 The court then held that homosexuals are subject to 
stereotyping and prejudice, so they are a suspect class.160 The court 
could find no valid justification for the denial of domestic partner-
ship benefits, and, since same-sex couples cannot marry, the court 
found that the policy was discriminatory.161 
4. Other issues 
Three legal issues related to domestic partnership laws have not 
yet been litigated: the effect of such laws on marriage law, the effect 
of the laws on religious freedom, and the effect of the laws on de-
mocratic self-government. 
a. Marriage. The most significant legal concern regarding do-
mestic partner benefits is the effect of the extension of these benefits 
on marriage law. If a court (such as in Tanner162) finds these benefits 
constitutionally required, it would not seem to be a large inferential 
leap to say that marriage status is also constitutionally required for 
same-sex couples.163 The essential claim would be: If same-sex cou-
ples have all the benefits of marriage, why not the title? In a less di-
rect way, recognizing same-sex relationships sets a precedent for ei-
 
 158. Id. at 445. 
 159. Id. at 446. 
 160. Id. at 447. 
 161. Id. at 448. The practical effect of this remarkable ruling is not yet clear. The State of 
Oregon chose not to appeal to the Oregon Supreme Court. In an unusual (but not unprece-
dented) procedural move, an Oregon state legislator sought a writ of mandamus to compel the 
state to appeal the ruling in order to defend the current state of the law. State ex rel. Sunseri v. 
Court of Appeals, No. 46055, 1999 Ore. LEXIS 116 (Or. Mar. 2, 1999). The petition for the 
writ, however, was denied by the Oregon Supreme Court. 
 162. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
 163. In the Tanner case, the Oregon Court of Appeals specifically declined to address the 
constitutionality of the Oregon marriage statute, but it is not hard to imagine that if same-sex 
couples are a suspect class, then denying them marriage rights would likely come under exact-
ing scrutiny. Tanner, 971 P.2d at 443 n.3. 
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ther (1) recognition of “sexual orientation” as a constitutionally rec-
ognized class, or (2) recognition of same-sex relationships as equiva-
lent to marriage. In other words, even if domestic partnerships are 
not constitutionally mandated, they may lead to a rethinking of con-
stitutional requirements in these two areas. 
b. Religious liberty. When domestic partnership laws include pro-
visions for forcing non-government employers to offer benefits, reli-
gious freedom concerns are also implicated. This possibility would 
arise where a religious organization or religious individual is an em-
ployer and objects on moral grounds to offering domestic partner-
ship benefits. Some religious organizations would decline to hire 
someone with a domestic partner or would decline to provide that 
employee the equivalent of spousal benefits if they subsequently 
learned that he or she had a domestic partner. In addition, while a 
religiously motivated person who is a private “secular” employer may 
feel that the personal choices of his or her employee are not an em-
ployment issue, that employer may still be hesitant to support these 
choices by offering benefits. If forbidden to make this judgment, in-
dividuals (or organizations) may be denied the opportunity to act on 
their beliefs regarding the immorality of nonmarital sexual relation-
ships.164 
c. Democracy. The cases seeking to compel recognition of domes-
tic partnerships through novel constitutional interpretations also 
raise serious issues for constitutional self-government. In the Tanner 
case, for instance, the court of appeals (1) held that Oregon’s sex-
discrimination law prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation, (2) created and defined a status of domestic partners to 
whom public employers were ordered to offer benefits, and (3) held 
that distinctions between married couples and unmarried same-sex 
 
 164. An analogous situation has arisen in a number of states where private individuals 
have been unwilling to rent to unmarried couples based on their religious conviction that do-
ing so would violate their religious beliefs related to sexual morality. See Smith v. Fair Em-
ployment & Hous. Comm’n, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996) (requiring landlord to rent to unmar-
ried couple despite religious objections to nonmarital sexual relationships does not violate state 
constitution’s free exercise clause); Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 874 P.2d 
274 (Alaska 1994) (same result); Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1994) 
(holding that requirement that landlord rent to unmarried couple in violation of conscience 
substantially burdens free exercise under state constitution); State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 
(Minn. 1990) (concluding that the Minnesota Constitution’s freedom of conscience provision 
outweighed state interest in preventing marital status discrimination in housing). 
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couples are constitutionally forbidden.165 In the case of the first and 
third issues, the Oregon Legislature had grappled with the issues but 
had not been able to resolve them. Regarding the second issue, al-
though creating and defining the status of domestic partners was 
clearly a legislative function, the trial court created such a status 
without any outside legal support.166 This attempt to circumvent the 
normal legislative process is dangerous because it threatens to un-
dermine the structure of state governments when one branch im-
poses on the province of another. It also threatens to undermine the 
legitimacy of the court as citizens sense that the court has over-
stepped its constitutional authority. 
B. Public Policy Concerns167 
Serious policy considerations of domestic partnership laws derive 
from the underlying nature of domestic partnerships. 
The crucial element of domestic partnerships is not the fact that 
they allow unmarried couples to gain some of the benefits of mar-
riage. Marriage is not about benefits. In fact, marriage law has always 
begun with a recognition of its uniqueness as a status—a union be-
tween a man and a woman. This uniqueness makes marriage particu-
larly well suited to advance certain goals. These include procreation 
(since a sexual relationship between a man and a woman is the only 
context in which procreation can take place naturally) and child-
rearing (because the commitment between parents in a marriage 
makes it more likely that children will be raised in a stable environ-
ment where they are guaranteed both a mother and father). Marriage 
between a man and a woman also provides protection to women and 
children from men who would take advantage of women sexually 
without being willing to make a commitment to either the woman 
or any children that result from their relationship.168 Recognizing the 
 
 165. Tanner, 971 P.2d at 442–44. 
 166. Even in Vermont, where the supreme court held that the state constitution required 
the extension of marital benefits to same-sex couples, the court held that creating the mecha-
nism to extend the benefits was a legislative function. See Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 
1999). 
 167. For the most part, these criticisms apply most directly to the municipal ordinances I 
have discussed and only by extension to the Principles. For a more thorough critique of the 
Principles, see Lynn D. Wardle, Deconstructing Family: A Critique of the American Law Insti-
tute’s “Domestic Partners” Proposal, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1189. 
 168. Parenthetically, it should be noted that marriage is different from both same-sex 
relationships in which any sexual relationship cannot result in procreation and different from 
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value of marriage to society, the state provides a package of benefits 
to those who marry.169 
The concept of domestic partnership seems to work the other 
way, recognizing that some people do not receive marital benefits, 
and trying to create a status that can then be used for identifying 
where the benefits ought to go.170 It is really a functional redefinition 
of marriage—one in which the status of marriage is separated from 
the benefits afforded it. Those benefits are meted out to other rela-
tionships which seem to fulfill some of the same functions as mar-
riage (such as economic interdependency, commitment, etc.).171 It is 
interesting to note that the definitional parameters of the domestic 
partnership laws are very similar to marriage (sometimes even making 
reference to marriage) but are still significantly broader in their scope 
by employing nebulous requirements such as “caring and commit-
ment.”172 
In upending the normal understanding of family law, which ac-
corded marriage a privileged status because of its unique contribu-
tion, these ordinances shift the burden from individuals to show that 
they deserve benefits because they have entered a status beneficial to 
society and to the state. Instead, the state is now required to justify 
its decision not to give benefits to any two people who feel commit-
ted to each other for an indeterminate amount of time. 
Still, the focus of the laws is not benefits. If it were, why would 
relatives be excluded? Certainly there are adult children of elderly 
parents who would benefit from being able to designate their parents 
as dependents. The answer is obvious—the intention is not to give 
out benefits; there are other ways to do that. The point is to create a 
status that serves as a parallel to marriage but which is inclusive of 
 
opposite-sex cohabiting relationships in which the parties may have children as a result of a 
sexual relationship but do not have the inherent stability that marriage provides. In addition, 
the vulnerability experienced by a woman in a relationship with a man. In a homosexual rela-
tionship, even though they may raise children together, their sexual relations cannot result in 
procreation; in such a relationship, it requires a willful decision to introduce children into the 
relationship. 
 169. See Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Pri-
vacy—Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463 (1983). 
 170. See, e.g., BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 16½-151 (1999); SANTA MONICA, 
CAL., CODE § 4.60.010 (1995). 
 171. See William C. Duncan, “Don’t Ever Take a Fence Down”: The “Functional” Defini-
tion of Family—Displacing Marriage in Family Law, 3 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 57 (2001). 
 172. See supra notes 82–93 and accompanying text. 
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those who are not married. The implications of the creation of do-
mestic partnership status are serious and troubling. Even in the ALI 
proposal, where relatives can be domestic partners, the language 
used is “share . . . life together as a couple.”173 It seems very unlikely 
that a parent and child would recognize their relationship as “li[ving] 
together as a couple.” In addition, the ALI’s placement of its recog-
nition of domestic partnerships in the Principles indicates its under-
standing of domestic partnerships as a type of “functional family” re-
lationship. 
Given the ability of unmarried couples to approximate the status 
of marriage through private agreements or by use of other laws,174 
one of the few benefits historically tied to marriage that still seems to 
be exclusive to marriage is the making licit of a sexual relationship—
that is, sending a message that society considers the marriage rela-
tionship to be the only appropriate context for sexual relations. Do-
mestic partnerships send the opposite message; particularly where 
there is a requirement of “intimacy,” domestic partnership laws pro-
vide legal and societal sanction to nonmarital sexual relationships.175 
They send a message that participating in nonmarital relationships is 
as valid a choice as the choice to be married. As one advocate of do-
mestic partner benefits put it, “The recognition of domestic partner-
ships also can have a broad societal and legal impact by establishing 
the legitimacy and acceptability of same-sex relationships.”176 In fact, 
this is the stated goal of many of the ordinances examined above.177 
In the case of the ALI proposal, the message will even include a 
statement that adulterous sexual relationships are appropriate.178 
In the desire to accommodate the choices people are making, the 
ALI ignores another reality—the fact that family law is replete with a 
system of incentives and disincentives and that it may choose to pro-
vide social disincentives to behavior it finds objectionable. The fail-
ure of most state legislatures to provide domestic partnership recog-
 
 173. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 19, § 6.03(1). 
 174. See HAYDEN CURRY ET AL., A LEGAL GUIDE FOR LESBIAN AND GAY COUPLES 
(1996). 
 175. See supra notes 82–93 and accompanying text. 
 176. Lewis Becker, Recognition of Domestic Partnerships by Governmental Entities and 
Private Employers, 1 NAT’L J. SEXUAL ORIENTATION L. 90, 101, at 
http://www.ibiblio.org/gaylaw/issue1/becker.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2001). 
 177. See supra notes 58–63 and accompanying text. 
 178. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
4DUN.DOC 12/5/01 1:21 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2001 
990 
nition may not be, as the ALI seems to assume, a mere oversight of 
existing trends, but a statement that the state wants to discourage ex-
tramarital sexual relationships—or at least not to privilege them. This 
is surely the case where the ALI allows a married person to have a 
domestic partnership with another person to whom he or she is not 
married. 
Another obvious policy implication of domestic partnership laws 
is the effect on the preferred status of marriage in society. Society has 
traditionally conferred special benefits only to marriage because of its 
unique contribution not only to each participant but to the larger 
community.179 These laws create a situation where marriage is con-
sidered just one way of organizing society in order to confer benefits. 
If marriage is just a convenient way to dispense benefits, domestic 
partnerships may be just as appropriate because they arguably pro-
vide as convenient a way to decide which relationships are entitled to 
economic and societal benefits. When the benefits traditionally re-
served for married couples are extended to other couples based on a 
nonmarital status, the obvious implication is that the law no longer 
considers marriage to be the uniquely valuable institution that it has 
been. Again, some of the domestic partnership ordinances admit as 
much with their invocation of the “changing nature of the family” 
and their references to multiple, equally valid family forms.180 As Pro-
fessor William Eskridge has noted, if marriage becomes only one 
more option, like a flavor of ice cream, its social position will eventu-
ally be undermined. According to Eskridge, “experimental laws like 
Vermont’s will undermine the institution of marriage [and] . . . , [i]n 
the long run, they threaten to make marriage obsolete.”181 In the 
past, couples who wanted to ensure the legitimacy of offspring, the 
licitness of sexuality, etc., had to marry. With the growing acceptance 
of alternative statuses, couples are able to choose the type of legal 
recognition they want for their relationship. Coupled with the par-
celing out of marital benefits to these other statuses, the draw of 
marriage could be severely weakened as couples are enticed to enter 
into other, less demanding legal obligations. 
Another challenge raised by domestic partnership laws is the ap-
 
 179. See Hafen, supra note 169. 
 180. See supra notes 46–51 and accompanying text. 
 181. William Eskridge, Jr., The Emerging Menu of Quasi-Marriage Options, at 
http://writ.findlaw.com/commentary/20000707_eskridge.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2001). 
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propriate limitations on the relationships recognized by the law. Cur-
rently, most of the ordinances apply only to single individuals, but 
the ALI proposal allows for a domestic partnership to exist even if a 
party is married to another person.182 If “commitment” or “caring” 
are the relevant determinants for establishing a domestic partner-
ship,183 why should the incest prohibitions be included? Why, for 
that matter, should there be a limitation on the numbers of individu-
als involved? It has been argued that such limitations should not ex-
ist.184 
Finally, a domestic partner relationship has the potential of bind-
ing individuals in a relationship that can never be a marriage and that 
can never contribute what a marriage could to the happiness of the 
partners or to the good of society.185 One such benefit is stability. 
Domestic partnership ordinances almost always allow for a quick dis-
solution of the relationship.186 Thus, while the partnership creates an 
impression that a marriage-like relationship is involved, this impres-
sion is really an illusion because the relationship, along with its bene-
fits and obligations, can usually be ended with extremely little effort. 
Research indicates that “the break-up rate of cohabitators is far 
higher than for married partners.”187 In addition, in a very realistic 
way, the legal sanction of cohabitation may tie partners in a destruc-
tive relationship. A recent report from The National Marriage Pro-
ject at Rutgers University noted that “[l]iving together outside of 
marriage increases the risk of domestic violence for women, and the 
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risk of physical and sexual abuse for children.”188 Finally, children 
raised by cohabitating adults are at greater risk of harm from parental 
break-up, abuse, and poverty.189 
There are certainly other problems with these types of laws and 
proposals that others will have noted. So far, there has been no sig-
nificant pro and con discussion of the legal or policy implications of 
domestic partnerships. Surely that should be a prerequisite to the 
creation of such a novel legal status or of its being proposed as part 
of a uniform family law system. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The law related to domestic partnerships seems to be a growth 
industry, although the number of jurisdictions which have adopted 
laws providing for such a status is still relatively small. With the 
promulgation of the ALI Principles, the matter may soon move to 
the forefront of family law issues and so must be examined with care. 
This article has attempted to provide some of that examination by 
surveying the current state of the law regarding domestic partner-
ships. It has also attempted to address a few of the serious and 
weighty issues raised by the adoption of such laws. The legal, phi-
losophical, and public policy problems inherent in the legal recogni-
tion of a new status for domestic partners caution against adoption 
of such laws; at the very least, the problems should give a state or lo-
cal legislative body pause before endorsing such a scheme. At a time 
when marriage is under threat on many fronts, it behooves policy 
makers to ask themselves whether the decisions they make will 
strengthen or further erode this institution, which has always been 
recognized as the basic unit of society and the foundation for the 
family. Then policies which threaten marriage, such as the legal rec-
ognition of domestic partnership status, should be rejected. 
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